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Weil's Quarterly Private Equity Update: Going Private Transactions in the U.S., the U.K. and Hong Kong

Private equity sponsors and other financial investors continue to look at going private transactions. In this update, we summarize key similarities and differences of going private transactions in three financial centers with global reach: the U.S., the U.K., and Hong Kong.

In general, the U.S. is the most different of the three jurisdictions since the U.K. and Hong Kong share many similarities. However, regardless of the location of the listing, going private transactions are also subject to the laws of the jurisdiction of the target's formation (its "home jurisdiction"). One distinction that sets Hong Kong apart from the U.K. and the U.S. is the relatively large proportion of listed companies that are formed outside of Hong Kong, and thus considerations with respect to deal structure will be affected by the laws of the target's home jurisdiction.

A significant difference among the three jurisdictions is the hurdle to acquire 100% of a listed company. In Delaware (the most commonly used U.S. jurisdiction), minority shareholders can be squeezed out with a simple majority. In the U.K. and Hong Kong, the threshold for a squeeze-out following an offer is 90%. A scheme of arrangement (in some respects similar to a merger in the U.S.) requires "only" 75% of the shares, but also requires court approval (Hong Kong additionally requires that not more than 10% vote against the transaction). In addition, shareholders who are given "special deals" (e.g., management rollover) are not counted for the purposes of the 90% squeeze out threshold and interested parties are disqualified from voting in a scheme. In the U.S., shares held by interested parties are not automatically excluded, though sometimes parties do so in an attempt to mitigate conflicts of interest.

Another significant difference is that the U.K. and Hong Kong are more target-friendly with respect to certain deal protections. Break fees payable by the target are universal in the U.S., principally in the exercise of a "fiduciary out" by the target board. However, in the U.K., such break fees are only permitted in limited circumstances and, while Hong Kong is not as restrictive as the U.K. with respect to the circumstances such fees are payable, the amount of any such fees must be *de minimis*.

It is typical, at signing, for buyers in the U.S. to deliver to the target equity and debt commitment letters to provide evidence of financial capability to consummate the transaction. In the U.K. and Hong Kong, buyers typically provide a definitive credit agreement alongside the equity commitment (in each case, on a "certain



funds" basis with buyers' financial advisors confirming certainty of funds). This cash confirmation process adds a significant additional component to transactions in the U.K. and Hong Kong.

The matters described above and other key similarities and differences among the three jurisdictions are summarized in the following chart. 1

	United States (Delaware)	United Kingdom²	Hong Kong
Mechanics			
Available means of acquisition	 A. Tender Offer: Offer to all holders to buy their shares. B. Merger: A statutory procedure, whereby one entity merges into the other and all of its assets and liabilities become the assets and liabilities of the other entity. 	A. Takeover Offer: Offer to all holders to buy their shares. • Mandatory Offer ("MO"): Triggered if 30% or more of voting rights acquired. • Voluntary Offer ("VO") B. Scheme of Arrangement: A statutory procedure approved by (i) the requisite threshold and (ii) the court. May only be used for non-hostile deals.	A. Takeover Offer: Offer to all holders to buy their shares. • MO: Triggered if 30% or more of voting rights acquired. • VO B. Scheme of Arrangement: A statutory procedure approved by (i) the requisite threshold and (ii) the court. May only be used for non-hostile deals.
Tender/Takeove	r Offers		
Required level of acceptance	No legally mandated amount, but typically set at a majority of voting shares.	<u>MO</u> : Must be set at a majority of the voting rights (" <u>Minimum</u> <u>Acceptance Condition</u> ").	MO: Must be set at the Minimum Acceptance Condition.
		<u>VO</u> : Can be a higher level (often 90% to allow a squeeze-out).	<u>VO</u> : Can be a higher level (often 90% to allow a squeeze-out).
Squeeze out Percentage	A majority of the voting shares (to effect a backend merger, subject to appraisal rights).	90% of the shares other than those owned by the buyer or its associates.	90% of the shares other than those owned by the buyer or its concert parties (i.e. "disinterested shares).

For the U.S., we have focused on Delaware corporations. Other U.S. states may have differing rules affecting corporations formed in those states.

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The information below applies to public companies incorporated in the U.K. which have their sole listing on the main market or the AIM market of the London Stock Exchange. Otherwise different rules may apply.



	United States (Delaware)	United Kingdom ²	Hong Kong
Time before closing	A tender offer must be open for at least 20 business days. Tender offers are often closed within 6 weeks.	A takeover offer must be open for at least 21 days and, subject to regulatory approvals, usually closes within 60 days (in each case, from the date of the formal offer document (which is typically issued within 28 days after announcement of the offer)).	A takeover offer must be open for at least 21 days and usually closes within 60 days (in each case, from the date of the formal offer document (which is typically issued within a month after announcement of the offer)).
Effect of insider on the required majority	Required majority is unaffected. However, acquisitions by a controlling stockholder are subject to heightened scrutiny, which potentially can be mitigated by use of substantive and procedural safeguards (e.g., special committee, fairness opinion and approval by a majority of the minority).	Shares held by a shareholder given a "special deal" (e.g., management rollover) (i) require consent of the Takeover Panel and (ii) typically do not count for the 90% squeeze-out threshold, but will usually count towards the acceptance condition of the offer.	Shares held by a shareholder given a "special deal" (e.g., management rollover) (i) require consent of the Securities and Futures Commission ("SFC") and (ii) typically do not count for the 90% squeeze-out threshold, but will usually count towards the acceptance condition of the offer.
Mergers / Scheme	s of Arrangement		
Required level of approval	Typically requires a majority of the target's voting shares (but a higher threshold may be imposed by organizational documents or by the merger agreement).	At least 75% of voting rights of disinterested shares cast, and simple majority of the number of shareholders who vote, at the court-convened shareholder meeting(s).	At least 75% of voting rights of disinterested shares cast at general meeting with no more than 10% of all disinterested shares voting against. ³
Time before closing	Assuming no extended regulatory review, mergers usually close in approximately 3 - 4 months after signing.	Posting of offer document normally occurs within 28 days of announcement, and (assuming no extended regulatory review) closing usually	Posting of offer document normally occurs within one month of announcement, and (assuming no extended regulatory review and subject to availability of

 $^{^{}m 3}$ The legal requirements of the home jurisdiction also apply.



	United States (Delaware)	United Kingdom ²	Hong Kong
		occurs 2-3 months after posting.	the courts) closing usually occurs 2-3 months after posting.
Appraisal rights	Dissenters have appraisal rights.	There are no appraisal rights.	None under HK Takeovers Code, but target's home jurisdiction may provide appraisal rights.
Effect of insider on the required majority	Required majority is unaffected. However, acquisitions by a controlling stockholder are subject to heightened scrutiny, which potentially can be mitigated by use of substantive and procedural safeguards (e.g., special committee, fairness opinion and approval by a majority of the minority).	Interested parties are disqualified from voting.	Interested parties are disqualified from voting.



	United States (Delaware)	United Kingdom ²	Hong Kong
Deal Terms and Pi	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
Typical closing conditions	General: Regulatory approvals, absence of material adverse change ("MAC") and no court orders/injunctions.	<u>MO</u> : May only be subject to the Minimum Acceptance Condition.	MO: May only be subject to the Minimum Acceptance Condition.
		VO (including Scheme): Typically contain additional conditions (including, for VOs, greater	VO (including Scheme): May contain additional conditions, (including, for VOs, greater than 50%
	Mergers: Approval of shareholders (if necessary).	than 50% acceptance, regulatory conditions and MAC).	acceptance, regulatory conditions and MAC).
	<u>Tender Offers</u> : Tendering of a number of shares (determined by the buyer).	Consent of the Takeover Panel (rarely given) is generally required to invoke a condition.	Consent of the SFC (rarely given) is generally required to invoke a condition.
		Offers cannot include subjective conditions.	Offers cannot include subjective conditions.
Break Fees	<u>General</u> : Break fees are typically payable. See below for triggers.	General: Break fees payable by the target are permitted only in very limited circumstances. Break fees payable by buyer are relatively uncommon.	General: Break fees payable by the target must be de minimis (see below), but the SFC must be consulted in advance and retains wide discretion. Break fees payable by buyer are relatively uncommon.
	Target Fee Triggers: Fiduciary duty termination by the target (e.g., superior proposal, recommendation change and intervening event) and completion of a similar transaction during a tail period.	Target Break Fee Trigger: (Where permitted) typically completion of a successful competing offer.	Target Break Fee Trigger: Circumstances under which target may pay break fees are not as restrictive as in the U.K.
	Buyer Fee Triggers: Buyer's failure to close when required or breach of agreement in certain cases.	Buyer Break Fee Trigger: Failure of certain conditions (e.g., regulatory/shareholder approval).	Buyer Break Fee Trigger: As mentioned above, this is not common.



	United States (Delaware)	United Kingdom ²	Hong Kong
	Amount: No hard cap, but target break fee size cannot deter rivals (often 2-4% of EV (often reduced during any go-shop period) and buyer break fees are often 4-8% of EV.	Amount: In the very limited circumstances in which they are permitted, a target break fee is capped at 1% of the offer value.	Amount: A break fee payable by target must be de minimis (usually no more than 1% of the offer value).
Fiduciary out	Prior to a stockholder vote, the target can enter into a superior proposal or withdraw its recommendation to its stockholders.	Not applicable since obligations on the target are generally prohibited. Target boards are generally free to consider and/or recommend competing proposals.	Not applicable since obligations on the target are generally prohibited. Target boards are generally free to consider and/or recommend competing proposals.
Minimum offer price	None.	MO: Highest price paid by the buyer during the prior 12 months. VO: Highest price paid by the buyer during the prior three months (including the offer period), subject to rules applicable to certain share purchases for cash.	MO: Highest price paid by the buyer during the offer period and within 6 months prior to its commencement. VO: Highest price paid by the buyer during the offer period and within 3 months prior to its commencement.
Financing			
Documents provided at signing	Equity commitment letter and limited guarantee from the sponsors. Debt commitment letters from the lenders.	Equity commitment letter from the sponsors and definitive credit agreement from the lenders, both on a "certain funds" basis.	Equity commitment letter from the sponsors and definitive credit agreement from the lenders, both on a "certain funds" basis.
		Buyer's financial advisor must confirm certainty of funds, and will request confirmations and undertakings to support the "certain funds" obligations.	Buyer's financial advisor must confirm certainty of funds, and will request confirmations and undertakings to support the "certain funds" obligations.
Financial assistance;	Financial assistance is permitted.	Financial assistance is not allowed for public companies.	Financial assistance is governed by the target's home jurisdiction.



	United States (Delaware)	United Kingdom ²	Hong Kong
whitewash procedures	There are no whitewash procedures in the U.S.	However, if 75% of voting rights are acquired, then the target may become a private company and give financial assistance in refinancing acquisition debt.	Financial assistance is restricted or difficult to execute in certain jurisdictions (e.g. Hong Kong and PRC). Other jurisdictions (e.g., Cayman and BVI) may be more flexible.



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REPRESENTATIVE 2019 TRANSACTIONS

Advent International

Stake acquisition

BIODURO

Undisclosed

January 2019

Aterian

Investment

Partners

Acquisition of

HAIN PURE PROTEIN

Undisclosed

June 2019

CPPIR

Consortium's

acquisition of

WAYSTAR

\$2,700,000,000

Pending

Cornell Capital

KDC/ONE's

acquisition of

Undisclosed

Pending Infravia Capital

Partners

Acquisition of

CELESTE

Undisclosed

March 2019

OTPP

Formation of

TRIVIUM

Undisclosed

October 2019

Providence

Equity Partners Investment in

Undisclosed

February 2019

Silver Lake

Sumeru

群 ForeFlight

Undisclosed

March 2019

TCV

Series F financing

FLiX Mobility GmbH

Undisclosed

July 2019



Undisclosed

June 2019

Apax Partners Stake acquisition

≯ SIGNAVIO \$177,000,000 Pending



January 2019 Cornell Capital

Undisclosed

KDC/ONE's acquisition of **ALKOS** Undisclosed July 2019

Partners Investor Group's stake sale

verticalbridge Undisclosed Pending

ОТРР Stake sale Cole-Parmer \$2,100,000,000

Pending Providence

Equity Partners Acquisition of

GLOBALTRANZ Undisclosed May 2019

PSP Investments Sale of A3 Advisor Group Undisclosed May 2019

TCV Investment in ✓ Clio

\$250,000,000 August 2019

Tower Three Partners Sale of MNTS Undisclosed

Pending

TowerBrook Capital Partners Sale of **GS**e May 2019

Undisclosed November 2019 Aterian Investment Partners Vander-Bend's acquisition of

Advent International

TSG's stake acquisitio

MARIANA TEK

(H) Undisclosed January 2019

CPPIB Consortium's sale of REFINITIV 🔫 \$27,000,000,000 Pending

CVC Capital Partners PAREX \$2,500,000,000 May 2019

J.C. Flowers Acquisition of Vericity

Undisclosed February 2019

OTPP

Series L funding round

for SPACEX Hagalagian June 2019

Partners Stake acquisition HIME Undisclosed June 2019

Providence Equity

SoftBank Vision Fund Investment in C2FO \$200,000,000 August 2019

TCV Investment in # PELOTON \$100,000,000 September 2019

TPG Global Stock acquisition CCELENTERTAINMEN \$884,000,000 November 2019

Advent Advent International International Culligan's acquisition Acquisition of T|S|G OASIS Undisclosed

Bain Capital Stake acquisition KANTAR \$4,000,000,000

Pending

Pending

CPPIR Consortium's takeprivate of Ultimate \$11,000,000,000 May 2019

Fiera Infrastructure Investment in CONTERRA Undisclosed April 2019

Mithril Capital Management Stake acquisition **σ**lonce

Undisclosed September 2019

ОТРР Investment in S I P SICEMALK INFRASTRUCTURE

Undisclosed August 2019

PSP Investments Investment in **⋈**lliant Undisclosed January 2019

SoftBank Vision Fund Investment in Undisclosed May 2019

TCV Partial sale Hire*Vue Undisclosed Pending

PG

Sale of

Pending

Adiacencies Minority investment 和睦家医疗 ABC TECHNOLOGIES \$1,440,000,000 Undisclosed

Advent International Culligan's acquisition of **AQUAVENTURE**HOLDINGS

Pending

Berkshire Partners

Recapitalization of

CPP:

Undisclosed

Pending

June 2019

Genstar Capital

Acquisition of

Oak Hill Capital

EPIC's acquisition

nt

Prime

Undisclosed

Pending

Providence

Equity Partners

Acquisition of

(12)

Undisclosed

November 2019

PSP Investments

Investment in

\$1,800,000,000

April 2019

Snow Phipps Group

Ideal Tridon's

acquisition of

4

Undisclosed

January 2019

convex

\$1,100,000,000 Undisclosed Pending

Acquisition of TERACO Undisclosed March 2019

Berkshire

Partners

Centerbridge Centerbridge Partners Partners Sale of Sale of P.F. CHANG'S PEI WEI Undisclosed Undisclosed

Genstar Capital Acquisition of DTE: Tronsmi Undisclosed

March 2019

Trucklite Undisclosed April 2019 December 2019

Novalpina Capital Acauisition of

> Undisclosed February 2019

OTPP Take-private bid 1)

inmarsat \$3,300,000,000 Pending

PSP Investments Acquisition of Undisclosed Pending

SoftBank Vision Fund Investment in

Uber \$1,000,000,000 July 2019

TCV

Series E financing

TPG Tech

July 2019

The Blackstone Group Investment in

]toast sema4 Undisclosed Undisclosed March 2019 August 2019

> Trive Capital Sale of STC

> > Undisclosed May 2019

Apax Partners Series E funding for classpass

\$285.000.000 December 2019

> Berkshire Partners Parts Town's acquisition of

‡ Heritage

Undisclosed October 2019

Cornell Capital KDC/ONE's acquisition of

BENCHMARK Undisclosed November 2019

Goldman Sachs Stake sale

ProQuest. Undisclosed Pending

Oaktree Capital Management

VERESCENCE Undisclosed February 2019

Providence Equity Partners
Acquisition of 2 0 H

Undisclosed August 2019

PSP Investments Acquisition of Series E fundina

Undisclosed June 2019

TCV Series E fundina

™VECTR∧ \$100,000,000 May 2019

The Blackstone Group

Investment in ConcertGolf Undisclosed

Pending

TPG Capital Asia, TPG Growth and OTPP Stake acquisition

DREAM CRUISES \$3,700,000,000 Pending



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