LITIGATION TRENDS 2025 | 85 T O C E M P E S G A N T I I P C A P R O W C S P O R T C O N T A C T I N T A P P P A T C C L S E C What Remains of Chevron Deference after Loper Bright – and How Does the New Framework Possibly Impact the USPTO? In 2024, the Supreme Court in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024), revisited the level of deference courts must give to administrative agency actions, overturning the longstanding precedent Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (which provided that “considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844). The Supreme Court found that Chevron deference “cannot be squared with” the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Loper Bright, 144 S.Ct. at 2263. Under the APA, “courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority,” Loper Bright, 144 S.Ct. at 2262. A court’s “independent judgment” does not prohibit consideration of the interpretation and rule-making of the agency when ruling on its interpretations or regulations. Indeed, the Court notes that courts may “seek aid from the interpretations of those responsible for implementing particular statutes” and that “interpretations issued contemporaneously with the statute at issue, and which have remained consistent over time, may be especially useful in determining the statute’s meaning.” Id. Such agency interpretation “may be especially informative to the extent it rests on factual premises within the agency’s expertise.” Id. at 2267 (cleaned up). Regardless of how informative an agency’s interpretations may be, a reviewing court must independently review the statute. The Supreme Court explains that “[w]hen the best reading of a statute is that it delegates discretionary authority to an agency, the role of the reviewing court under the APA is, as always, to independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress subject to constitutional limits.” Id. at 2263. Patent Litigation David J. Lender Partner New York david.lender@weil.com P A T 84 | Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
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