



**The Journal of Robotics,
Artificial Intelligence & Law**

Editor's Note: Can You Keep a (Trade) Secret?

Victoria Prussen Spears

Show Me Your Secrets: How the Use of Trade Secrets Relates to the Demand for
Transparent Artificial Intelligence—Part I

Sander Vogt

Can a Robot Tell That an Employee Is About to Quit? The Use of People Analytics to
Prevent Trade Secret Theft

David J. Walton

DeFi: Blockchain Risks Make the Case for Blockchain Insurance

John P. Mastando III

The Advent of Autonomy Drives Novel Considerations for Insurance in a Driverless
World

John P. Mastando III and Yonatan Shefa

The Law and Politics of Legal Data

Sarah A. Sutherland

Everything Is Not *Terminator*: AI Analysis of Personal Data Under the Fourth
Amendment

John Frank Weaver

- 219 Editor’s Note: Can You Keep a (Trade) Secret?**
Victoria Prussen Spears
- 223 Show Me Your Secrets: How the Use of Trade Secrets Relates to the Demand for Transparent Artificial Intelligence—Part I**
Sander Vogt
- 243 Can a Robot Tell That an Employee Is About to Quit? The Use of People Analytics to Prevent Trade Secret Theft**
David J. Walton
- 249 DeFi: Blockchain Risks Make the Case for Blockchain Insurance**
John P. Mastando III
- 261 The Advent of Autonomy Drives Novel Considerations for Insurance in a Driverless World**
John P. Mastando III and Yonatan Shefa
- 269 The Law and Politics of Legal Data**
Sarah A. Sutherland
- 283 Everything Is Not *Terminator*: AI Analysis of Personal Data Under the Fourth Amendment**
John Frank Weaver

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Steven A. Meyerowitz

President, Meyerowitz Communications Inc.

EDITOR

Victoria Prussen Spears

Senior Vice President, Meyerowitz Communications Inc.

BOARD OF EDITORS

Miranda Cole

Partner, Covington & Burling LLP

Kathryn DeBord

Partner & Chief Innovation Officer, Bryan Cave LLP

Melody Drummond Hansen

Partner, O'Melveny & Myers LLP

Paul B. Keller

Partner, Allen & Overy LLP

Garry G. Mathiason

Shareholder, Littler Mendelson P.C.

Elaine D. Solomon

Partner, Blank Rome LLP

Linda J. Thayer

Partner, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner LLP

Edward J. Walters

Chief Executive Officer, Fastcase Inc.

John Frank Weaver

Attorney, McLane Middleton, Professional Association

THE JOURNAL OF ROBOTICS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & LAW (ISSN 2575-5633 (print) /ISSN 2575-5617 (online) at \$495.00 annually is published six times per year by Full Court Press, a Fastcase, Inc., imprint. Copyright 2022 Fastcase, Inc. No part of this journal may be reproduced in any form—by microfilm, xerography, or otherwise—or incorporated into any information retrieval system without the written permission of the copyright owner. For customer support, please contact Fastcase, Inc., 711 D St. NW, Suite 200, Washington, D.C. 20004, 202.999.4777 (phone), 202.521.3462 (fax), or email customer service at support@fastcase.com.

Publishing Staff

Publisher: Morgan Morrissette Wright

Production Editor: Sharon D. Ray

Cover Art Design: Juan Bustamante

Cite this publication as:

The Journal of Robotics, Artificial Intelligence & Law (Fastcase)

This publication is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional services. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.

Copyright © 2022 Full Court Press, an imprint of Fastcase, Inc.

All Rights Reserved.

A Full Court Press, Fastcase, Inc., Publication

Editorial Office

711 D St. NW, Suite 200, Washington, D.C. 20004

<https://www.fastcase.com/>

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to THE JOURNAL OF ROBOTICS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & LAW, 711 D St. NW, Suite 200, Washington, D.C. 20004.

Articles and Submissions

Direct editorial inquiries and send material for publication to:

Steven A. Meyerowitz, Editor-in-Chief, Meyerowitz Communications Inc.,
26910 Grand Central Parkway, #18R, Floral Park, NY 11005, smeyerowitz@
meyerowitzcommunications.com, 631.291.5541.

Material for publication is welcomed—articles, decisions, or other items of interest to attorneys and law firms, in-house counsel, corporate compliance officers, government agencies and their counsel, senior business executives, scientists, engineers, and anyone interested in the law governing artificial intelligence and robotics. This publication is designed to be accurate and authoritative, but neither the publisher nor the authors are rendering legal, accounting, or other professional services in this publication. If legal or other expert advice is desired, retain the services of an appropriate professional. The articles and columns reflect only the present considerations and views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the firms or organizations with which they are affiliated, any of the former or present clients of the authors or their firms or organizations, or the editors or publisher.

QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION?

For questions about the Editorial Content appearing in these volumes or reprint permission, please contact:

Morgan Morrisette Wright, Publisher, Full Court Press at mwright@fastcase.com
or at 202.999.4878

For questions or Sales and Customer Service:

Customer Service

Available 8 a.m.–8 p.m. Eastern Time

866.773.2782 (phone)

support@fastcase.com (email)

Sales

202.999.4777 (phone)

sales@fastcase.com (email)

ISSN 2575-5633 (print)

ISSN 2575-5617 (online)

DeFi: Blockchain Risks Make the Case for Blockchain Insurance

John P. Mastando III*

The new blockchain frontier has been said to offer insurers the chance to delve into new markets, improve fraud detection and pricing, and reduce expenses. Insurers have harnessed blockchain technology to build novel products as well. Understanding the developing regulatory environment will also help insurers navigate this expanding market. The author of this article discusses blockchain insurance.

A surge of interest in blockchain has resulted in a growing insurance market. The technology famously behind Bitcoin has expanded into an entire “decentralized finance” ecosystem, colloquially known as “DeFi.” Some observers claim that the abundance of blockchain-native financial products that have sprouted offer new opportunities to the public and the insurance industry. Prominent commentators, including Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Chair Gary Gensler, have declared DeFi a “Wild West”—with many highlighting new risks such as smart contract risk, governance risk, and oracle risk that present novel drivers of insurance demand.¹ This new frontier has been said to offer insurers the chance to delve into new markets, improve fraud detection and pricing, and reduce expenses. Insurers have harnessed blockchain technology to build novel products as well.² Understanding the developing regulatory environment will also help insurers navigate this expanding market.

Beyond Bitcoin: Building Blockchains Have Laid a Groundwork of Opportunity

Blockchain technology, a type of distributed ledger technology (“DLT”), refers to the infrastructure and protocols for otherwise independent computers to simultaneously access, validate, and maintain data by replicating, saving, and updating identical copies of a ledger without a central authority.³

Bitcoin, first outlined in 2008, is generally considered to have been the first blockchain used effectively as a store of value.⁴ But by design, the Bitcoin blockchain is limited to being a medium of exchange by functioning as a record of transactions. By contrast, many observers have traced the origin of DeFi to around 2015 when a new blockchain called Ethereum introduced the capacity for developers to embed business applications, or “smart contracts,” on the blockchain.⁵ The technology enabled sophisticated decentralized financial products.⁶ Thus, DeFi was born.

In the paradigmatic DeFi protocol, a smart contract is coded to “lock” some value on the blockchain, and will unlock upon a predefined event. A protocol can thereby act as a decentralized and automatic investment or lending vehicle. Likewise, corporate governance of these smart contracts can be designed to be decentralized.⁷ For example, Aave, currently the largest DeFi protocol, allows users to invest and earn interest, and uses the pool of capital from those investments to fund smart contract lending.⁸ In exchange for depositing funds, users receive Aave tokens, which entitle them both to propose and vote on governance changes, their vote proportionally weighted by their tokens’ value.⁹

Analysts have suggested that smart contracts lower barriers of access to financing; increase efficiency, interoperability, and transparency; and reduce costs associated with disputes.¹⁰ The DeFi sector has reportedly grown to over \$100 billion in market capital.¹¹

Insurance Options Have Appeared in Connection With Risks Unique to DeFi

While commentators generally have suggested that DeFi offers decentralized financial products, they have also widely identified novel forms of associated risk. Bitcoin insurance policies for risk of theft or loss coverage have already appeared. For instance, the cryptocurrency exchange Coinbase announced the purchase of \$255 million in such coverage from Aon in 2019—to cover crypto assets held in so-called “hot” storage, reportedly meaning the assets were stored “essentially online and open to potential hacks.”¹² Daily price fluctuation can also make for additional considerations when insuring assets such as Bitcoin, but this has led insurers to innovate.¹³ Lloyd’s notably advertises a “first of its kind liability policy” that provides “flexible limits” that increase or decrease in accordance

with price changes of crypto assets to “indemnif[y] for the underlying value” even if that value fluctuates over the policy period.¹⁴

Beyond cryptocurrency, commentators have identified a number of other risks unique to DeFi, including: (1) smart contract risk, (2) governance risk, and (3) oracle risk.¹⁵ Observers have further noted the potential of rapidly emerging DeFi regulation. Analysts have commented that competent insurance options may be important to the continued growth and viability of the space.¹⁶ Speaking to *Forbes* about DeFi insurance, Marouane Hajji, blockchain entrepreneur and founder of crypto insurance platform Unslashed, stated: “[Insurance is] really the bedrock on which everything else is built. . . . It’s of paramount importance for banking, trade, international commerce, anything in finance really, relies on insurance.”¹⁷

A closer look at certain of these risks and the insurance offerings already emerging to respond to them highlights the development of insurance in the rapidly growing DeFi space.

Smart Contract Risk

Analysts have indicated that DeFi faces a variety of unique and novel risks, which also offer opportunity for the insurance industry.¹⁸ The first of these has been called “smart contract risk.” Analogous to drafting issues in traditional contracts, smart contracts are vulnerable to coding errors. Such errors—or hacking exploits designed to take advantage of them—can divert the value stored inside smart contracts or render it inaccessible. If a mechanism to correct a fault in the programming is lacking, value can even be irretrievably lost.¹⁹

Over the past few years there have been reports of attacks on DeFi platforms causing substantial losses.²⁰ Famously, a DeFi protocol known as the distributed autonomous organization, or DAO—established to build a smart contract venture capital firm—suffered a hack in 2016 and lost \$50 million in value. This loss led the core developers behind the Ethereum blockchain to hack the hacker to retrieve the lost value and then execute a so-called “hard fork,” reprogramming the Ethereum blockchain itself to unwind the transactions.²¹

Such smart contract risk has produced demand for insurance products. While traditional insurance options to deal with DeFi risks are reportedly still limited, DeFi insurance based on

blockchain technology has begun to appear.²² One such market entrant, Nexus Mutual, claims to have grown to insure over \$1 billion in value.²³

Nexus Mutual insures against errors or hacks in blockchain transactions resulting in loss.²⁴ The insurance product is advertised as operating in a discretionary mutual structure, whereby those purchasing the product become members of the product structure who receive voting rights to whether a claim should result in a payout.²⁵ The members commit cryptocurrency to fund share pools of collateral against smart contract vulnerabilities.²⁶ Members pay a small fee, and acquire an “NXM token” that entitles them to participate, as well as to vote on governance decisions.²⁷ Then, members can “stake” (put up as collateral) cryptocurrency to fund a pool for a smart contract, or enter the details of a DeFi investment—including, among other things, the amount of value and the duration for the investment that will be covered—and receive a quote.²⁸ Insured users can then at any time submit a claim, which is paid when approved by the vote of members, subject to any governance measures instituted by the members.²⁹

Numerous other blockchain-based insurance protocols are also currently on offer or in development in the space. Traditional insurers too have begun to venture into blockchain-based smart contract solutions; for instance, in the case of Allianz, to automate catastrophe swap transactions (financial instruments in which an insurer pays a third party to assume the risk of a defined catastrophic event in exchange for a string of payments).³⁰

Governance Risk

Another core risk category driving novel insurance offerings in the space has been termed “governance risk.”³¹ While some DeFi protocols are purely autonomous after launch, many build in governance procedures, as mentioned above.³² Commentators have suggested that protocols utilizing decentralized governance may be at risk of a malicious actor exploiting procedures to drain value from a protocol.³³ Observers have further noted that, while as of August 2021 there had not yet been a successful governance attack on any Ethereum-based DeFi protocol, such attacks might arise at some point in the future.³⁴

Analysts point to more subtle governance risks that have led to new insurance opportunities as well. For instance, some protocols rely on a practice called “slashing,” which incentivizes consistent processing performance by the entities hosting the blockchain by exacting a predefined monetary penalty for lack of compliance. Launched in June 2021, the platform Unslashed offers policies to insure against certain risks, including slashing.³⁵ Unslashed’s decentralized insurance protocol has reportedly issued nearly a billion dollars of insurance coverage.³⁶ In one example, Unslashed provides \$200 million worth of slashing coverage for a prominent DeFi protocol Lido, which allows users to invest or “stake” tokens for a return.³⁷

Oracle Risk

“Oracle risk” presents a third core category that commentators have identified as particular to DeFi.³⁸ Oracles are systems or third parties that transfer information from the outside world into a blockchain system. For instance, Chainlink is a decentralized oracle network that provides data feeds, such as the price of Bitcoin, to many DeFi platforms, like Aave, which enables loans and interest on deposits.³⁹ Without oracles, DeFi protocols are isolated from the outside world, and outside information like price data is necessary to make many protocols useful.⁴⁰ However, analysts have indicated that these oracles can also pose a potential point of weakness for malicious actors to attack.⁴¹ One such exploit, highlighted by a security researcher known by the Twitter handle “samczun,” affected the DeFi platforms bZx and DDEX, exposing, at the time, the equivalent of \$700,000 in value.⁴² Later, when the bZx platform was attacked in a different fashion, its cofounder nonetheless emphasized that the protocol was bolstering oracle security in response, noting concern that oracles could “become a central point of failure.”⁴³

Other commentators have identified oracle risks as systemic.⁴⁴ As one commentator noted, even if a technological solution is found “it will still take many years for that system to become trusted. And as the pot of money controlled by the oracles continues to grow, so too will the potential reward for someone who finds a flaw in the design.”⁴⁵

Despite the risk, observers suggest that oracles in their own right have a role to play in offering new opportunities to the insurance industry. The decentralized oracle network Chainlink has advertised its potential use to build “parametric” insurance products—meaning products that provide a pre-specified payout when triggered by a pre-defined event, or parameter, without adjustment—by relaying real-world data onto the blockchain.⁴⁶ Chainlink’s representatives suggest that such parametric insurance contracts could insure against clearly defined events and automatically provide a pre-agreed amount should the event occur.⁴⁷ Indeed, backers of other parametric insurance protocols have contended that such decentralized insurance could make possible reliable, automatic insurance against difficult to predict events like earthquakes, without costly and time-consuming claims investigations.⁴⁸

Regulation and the Compelling Path Forward for Insurance

While insurance in DeFi is clearly a growing market, developing regulation is sure to influence the future of the industry. Observers have taken note of the breadth and speed at which regulatory action has begun to occur. China recently intensified a crackdown on cryptocurrencies with a blanket ban on all cryptocurrency trading and mining.⁴⁹ The U.S. Department of the Treasury too issued sanctions blacklisting a cryptocurrency platform accused of assisting cyber criminals to convert funds into traditional government-backed currencies, labeling a cryptocurrency exchange, for the first time, a “malicious cyber actor.”⁵⁰

Further, nascent U.S. federal regulatory action has begun at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the SEC, and the Internal Revenue Service.⁵¹ The SEC notably has approved a Bitcoin futures-based exchange-traded fund (“ETF”).⁵² Additionally, the infrastructure spending bill signed into law by President Biden on November 15, 2021, increased the reporting requirements for cryptocurrency transactions, requiring cryptocurrency brokers to issue Form 1099-Bs to customers for the 2023 tax year and requiring businesses that receive \$10,000 or more in payments of cryptocurrency to report the sender’s identity to the government.⁵³ The novelty of DeFi technology contributes to ambiguity as to the rules that DeFi must follow, and who will enforce them.⁵⁴

In this fluid space, enforcement actions are shaping the regulatory environment insurers will want to keep apprised of. On August 6, 2021, the SEC issued an order, reprimanding Blockchain Credit Partners, operators of a DeFi Money Market, in part for using smart contracts to sell digital tokens that offered specified returns, which the SEC alleged was an unregistered securities offering.⁵⁵ The DeFi Money Market operators were ordered to disgorge in excess of \$10 million in profits.⁵⁶

Recent remarks by SEC Chair Gary Gensler portend further regulatory attention. Gensler suggested that, in his view, crypto assets are “highly speculative stores of value” that often “are offered and sold as securities,” and thus “are subject to the securities laws and must work within our securities regime.” Gensler states that “significant gaps in investor protection” exist, and claims very broad SEC authority while also calling for Congressional action to grant, among other things, “additional plenary authority to write rules for and attach guardrails to crypto trading and lending.”⁵⁷

In particular, stablecoins have drawn regulatory focus. Stablecoins are crypto tokens that are pegged to some value. Many are tied to the U.S. dollar, such as tokens called USDC, Tether, and Dai. But stablecoins may be pegged to other assets, like gold—as in the case of the recently launched Djed.⁵⁸ Stablecoins are said to facilitate crypto market operation by reducing the volatility associated with other cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin or Ethereum.⁵⁹ Notably, in November 2020, Bridge Mutual, a decentralized insurance provider, announced an insurance coverage offering for stablecoins, noting at that time “the massive \$20B+ stablecoin economy, which is growing at an exponential rate.”⁶⁰ In recent remarks, however, Gensler likened stablecoins to “poker chips,” and the SEC prevented the cryptocurrency exchange Coinbase from implementing a plan to pay users interest on stablecoin holdings.⁶¹ Regulators have announced concerns that stablecoins are susceptible to the equivalent of bank runs, and could pose systemic risk.⁶² Stablecoins are said to have helped facilitate the growth of DeFi, and commentators have suggested that it is unclear how their regulation could affect the industry as a whole.⁶³

At present, while the DeFi ecosystem and associated insurance offerings are growing rapidly, it is unclear how emerging regulation will mold the sector. Understanding and readiness to advocate from a number of viewpoints will be essential to anyone navigating this exciting space.

Notes

* John P. Mastando III (john.mastando@weil.com) is a partner in Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP's Complex Commercial Litigation practice group and co-head of the firm's Insurance Litigation practice. Jay R. Minga, a former counsel at the firm, and Aaron J. Brogan, a former associate at the firm, contributed to this article.

1. See, e.g., Sara Morrison, Biden's SEC is ready to regulate cryptocurrency, *Recode* (Sept. 9, 2021), <https://www.vox.com/recode/22663312/coinbase-sec-cryptocurrency-bitcoin>; Sylvan Lane, Gensler compares cryptocurrency market, regulations, to "wild west," *The Hill* (Sept. 14, 2021), <https://thehill.com/policy/finance/572278-gensler-compares-cryptocurrency-market-regulations-to-wild-west>.

2. See, e.g., Insurance Practice, McKinsey & Co., Blockchain in Insurance—Opportunity or Threat? 2-3 (July 2016), <https://www.mckinsey.com/~media/mckinsey/industries/financial%20services/our%20insights/blockchain%20in%20insurance%20opportunity%20or%20threat/blockchain-in-insurance-opportunity-or-threat.ashx>; Bridge Mutual, Bridge Mutual Becomes First Company to Offer Decentralized Insurance on Stablecoins (Nov. 17, 2020), <https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/11/17/2128417/0/en/Bridge-Mutual-Becomes-First-Company-to-Offer-Decentralized-Insurance-on-Stablecoins.html>.

3. See Campbell R. Harvey, Ashwin Ramachandran & Joey Santoro, *DeFi and the Future of Finance* 18-19 (1st ed., 2021).

4. See McKinsey, *supra* n.2.

5. See, e.g., The beguiling promise of decentralised finance, *Economist* (Sept. 18, 2021), <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/09/18/the-beguiling-promise-of-decentralised-finance>; Harvey et al., *supra* n.3, at 5-6.

6. See, e.g., *Economist*, *supra* n.5; Harvey et al., *supra* n.3, at 5-6.

7. See Wharton Blockchain and Digital Asset Project, *DeFi Beyond the Hype*, Wharton, at 5-6 (May 2021), <https://wifpr.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/DeFi-Beyond-the-Hype.pdf>.

8. See Alex Moskov, *What Is Aave? An Overview of the Budding DeFi Lending Platform*, *CoinCentral* (Mar. 7, 2021), <https://coincentral.com/what-is-aave/>.

9. *Governance*, Aave, <https://docs.aave.com/governance/> (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).

10. See Harvey et al., *supra* n.3, at 2-4; Joon Ian Wong & Ian Kar, Everything you need to know about the Ethereum "hard fork" (July 18, 2016), <https://qz.com/730004/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-ethereum-hard-fork/>.

11. See Wharton, *supra* n.7, at 1; *Economist*, *supra* n.5; Brady Dale, *DeFi is Now a \$100B Sector*, *CoinDesk* (April 29, 2021), <https://www.coindesk>

.com/defi-100-billion-dolla. See also The Liquidity Protocol, Aave, <https://aave.com> (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).

12. See How Is Coinbase Insured?, Coinbase, <https://www.coindesk.com/coinbase-insurance-coverage/> (last visited Oct. 29, 2021). See also Brian O'Connell, Guide to Insurance on Cryptocurrency, Insurance Thought Leadership (Mar. 2, 2021), <https://www.insurancethoughtleadership.com/guide-to-insurance-on-cryptocurrency/> (explaining that over 40 million people use some form of cryptocurrency).

13. See O'Connell, *supra* n.12.

14. See Lloyd's has launched a new insurance policy to protect cryptocurrency held in online wallets against theft or other malicious hacks, Lloyds, <https://www.lloyds.com/about-lloyds/media-centre/press-releases/lloyds-launches-new-cryptocurrency-wallet-insurance-solution-for-coincover> (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).

15. See Harvey et al., *supra* n.3, at 130-38.

16. See Emily Mason, 24% Investment Yields? New Crypto Insurance Platform Doubles Down on DeFi Risk, Forbes (Aug. 17, 2021), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilymason/2021/08/17/24-investment-yields-new-crypto-insurance-platform-doubles-down-on-defi-risk/?sh=463816447387>.

17. See Mason, *supra* n.16. See also Antoine Tardif, Marouane Hajji, Founder of Unslashed Finance—Interview Series, Securities.io (June 17, 2021), <https://www.securities.io/marouane-hajji-founder-of-unslashed-finance-interview-series/>.

18. See, e.g., Harvey et al., *supra* n.3, at 130-35; Taylor Locke, 'Investors must be vigilant and cautious' following the massive \$600 million DeFi hack, experts say, CNBC (Aug. 11, 2021), <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/11/over-600-million-dollars-was-stolen-in-a-massive-defi-hack.html>.

19. See Harvey et al., *supra* n.3, at 131.

20. See, e.g., Derek Rose, THORChain hacked for third time in a month, with \$11m stolen, Stockhead (July 23, 2021), <https://stockhead.com.au/crypto-currency/thorchain-hacked-for-third-time-in-a-month-with-a-11m-stolen/>; Woon & Kar, *supra* n.10; Klint Finley, A \$50 Million Hack Just Showed that the DAO Was All Too Human, Wired (June 18, 2016), <https://www.wired.com/2016/06/50-million-hack-just-showed-dao-human/>.

21. See Woon & Kar, *supra* n.10; Finley, *supra* n.20.

22. Other blockchain-based assets have given rise to insurance products of their own. For instance, non-fungible tokens, or NFTs, are crypto assets frequently tied to rights in digital works of art or more abstract concepts (e.g., a sports highlight). The artist Beeple in March 2021 famously sold an NFT of a collage for \$69 million at auction at Christie's. Fine art insurance, however, typically deals with destruction or theft of a physical object, whereas NFTs function more akin to a title. The nature of NFTs as an abstract ownership claim, combined with volatile valuations of NFTs, has introduced additional considerations for underwriting according to many observers. See Bethan

Moorcraft, How can we insure NFTs?, Insurance Business America (July 13, 2021), <https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/breaking-news/how-can-we-insure-nfts-260576.aspx>. These markets are reportedly growing rapidly however, and the need for insurance with them. See Adam Zuckerman, Insuring Crypto: The Birth of Digital Asset Insurance, 2021 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol'y 75, 88 (2021) ("The total available coverage for digital assets is projected at around \$6 billion with an estimated \$ 200 million to \$500 million in annual premiums.").

23. See Rob Badman, While DeFi suffers more hacks, we chat to the Aussie founder of crypto insurance solution Nexus Mutual, Stockhead (Aug. 5, 2021), <https://stockhead.com.au/cryptocurrency/while-defi-suffers-more-hacks-we-chat-to-the-aussie-founder-of-crypto-insurance-solution-nexus-mutual/>.

24. See Nexus Mutual, <https://nexusmutual.io/> (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).

25. Kayleigh Petrie, Understanding Nexus Mutual, Nexus Mutual (Mar. 9, 2020), <https://medium.com/nexus-mutual/understanding-nexus-mutual-bb2946dad919>.

26. See *id.*

27. Nexus Mutual, NXM Token Model, <https://nexusmutual.io/token-model.html> (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).

28. See Petrie, *supra* n.25.

29. See *id.*

30. See Blockchain technology successfully piloted by Allianz Risk Transfer and Nephila for catastrophe swap, Allianz (June 15, 2016), <https://www.allianz.com/en/press/news/commitment/sponsorship/160615-blockchain-technology-successfully-piloted.html>. See also McKinsey, *supra* n.2.

31. See Wharton, *supra* n.7; Harvey et al., *supra* n.3, at 135-36.

32. See Wharton, *supra* n.7; Harvey et al., *supra* n.3, at 135-36.

33. See Wharton, *supra* n.7, at 6; Harvey et al., *supra* n.3, at 135-36.

34. See Harvey et al., *supra* n.3, at 135-36.

35. See Decentralized Insurance Platform Unslashed Launches Offering Wide-Ranging Policies Covering Over 1\$ [sic] Billion in Crypto Assets, Yahoo! Finance (June 2, 2021), <https://finance.yahoo.com/news/decentralized-insurance-platform-unslashed-launches-160000913.html>.

36. See Mason, *supra* n.16.

37. See *id.*

38. See, e.g., Harvey et al., *supra* n.3, at 136-38.

39. See Cryptocurrency (USD pairs) Data Feeds, Chainlink, https://data.chain.link/?_ga=2.100413470.1479877020.1633356233-1279733676.1633356233 (last visited Oct. 29, 2021); Price Oracle, Aave, <https://docs.aave.com/developers/v/1.0/developing-on-aave/the-protocol/price-oracle> (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).

40. See Harvey et al., *supra* n.3, at 136.

41. See Harvey et al., *supra* n.3, at 136; Alejandro Miguel, USD \$700,000 Put at Risk by On-Chain Oracle Exploit, DeFi Rate (Oct. 2, 2019), <https://defirate.com/on-chain-oracle-exploit/>. See also Attack Vector, Sumologic, <https://www.sumologic.com/glossary/attack-vector/> (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).

42. See Miguel, *supra* n.41.

43. Kyle Kistner, *Post-Mortem*, bZx (Feb. 17, 2020), <https://bzx.network/blog/postmortem-ethdenver>.

44. Giuli Caldarelli & Joshua Ellul, The Blockchain Oracle Problem in Decentralized Finance—A Multivocal Approach, *Appl. Sci.* (Aug. 18, 2021), <https://doi.org/10.3390/app11167572>.

45. Kyle Torpey, DeFi's Oracle Problem May Not Be Solvable, LongHash (Apr. 28, 2020), <https://www.longhash.com/en/news/3324/DeFi%E2%80%99s-Oracle-Problem-May-Not-Be-Solvable>.

46. Harry Papacharissiou, How to Build a Parametric Insurance Smart Contract, Chainlink (Dec. 15, 2020), <https://blog.chain.link/parametric-insurance-smart-contract/>.

47. See Adelyn Zhou, How blockchain smart contracts are reinventing the insurance industry, Nasdaq (Jan. 29, 2021), <https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/how-blockchain-smart-contracts-are-reinventing-the-insurance-industry-2021-01-29>.

48. See, e.g., Risk Harbor, Why Parametric Insurance Is the Only Solution for DeFi Insurance, Coinmonks (Apr. 21, 2021), <https://medium.com/coinmonks/why-parametric-insurance-is-the-only-solution-for-defi-insurance-20db375d9f74>.

49. Alun John, Samuel Shen & Tom Wilson, China's top regulators ban crypto trading and mining, sending bitcoin tumbling, Reuters (Sept. 24, 2021), <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-central-bank-vows-crackdown-cryptocurrency-trading-2021-09-24/>.

50. Ben Kochman, Crypto Exchange Blacklisting to Test US Sanctions' Teeth, Law360 (Sept. 24, 2021), https://www.law360.com/cybersecurity-privacy/articles/1424367/crypto-exchange-blacklisting-to-test-us-sanctions-teeth-?nl_pk=1331e9d1-9620-48bb-804c-ce878588fdfe&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=cybersecurity-privacy.

51. See, e.g., Morrison, *supra* n.1.

52. See John, McCrank, U.S. futures-based bitcoin ETF rises in first day of trading, bitcoin nears record, Reuters (Oct. 19, 2021), <https://www.reuters.com/technology/bitcoin-nears-record-high-ahead-futures-etf-listing-2021-10-19/>.

53. See Laura Davison, How Taxing Crypto Got Changed by Biden's Infrastructure Law, Bloomberg QuickTake (Nov. 17, 2021), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-17/how-taxing-crypto-got-changed-by-infrastructure-law-quicktake>; Sheehan Chandrasekera, How The Infrastructure Bill Is Brewing A Crypto Tax Compliance Nightmare, Forbes (Nov. 31, 2021), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/shehanchandrase>

ker/2021/11/30/how-the-infrastructure-bill-is-brewing-a-crypto-tax-compliance-nightmare/?sh=15c11f1369a9.

54. See Jai Massari & Christian Catalani, DeFi, Disintermediation, and the Regulatory Path Ahead, *The Regulatory Review* (May 10, 2021), <https://www.theregreview.org/2021/05/10/massari-catalini-defi-disintermediation-regulatory-path-ahead/>.

55. See SEC Charges Decentralized Finance Lender and Top Executives for Raising \$30 Million Through Fraudulent Offerings, SEC (Aug. 6, 2021), <https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-145> (the DeFi Money Market operators also allegedly defrauded investors by failing to fulfil their promise to use revenues from the coin offerings to purchase real world assets).

56. Blockchain Credit Partners, Securities Act Release No. 10961, Exchange Act Release No. 92588, 2021 SEC LEXIS 2197, at *28-29 (Aug. 6, 2021).

57. See Gary Gensler, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the Aspen Security Forum (Aug. 3, 2021), <https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/gensler-aspen-security-forum-2021-08-03>.

58. See Ana Grabundzija, A gold-backed stablecoin will be launching on Cardano, *CryptoSlate* (Oct. 2, 2021), <https://cryptoslate.com/a-gold-backed-stablecoin-will-be-launching-on-cardano/>.

59. See Harvey et al., *supra* n.3, at 24.

60. See Bridge Mutual Becomes First Company to Offer Decentralized Insurance on Stablecoins, *GlobeNewswire* (Nov. 17, 2020), <https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/11/17/2128417/0/en/Bridge-Mutual-Becomes-First-Company-to-Offer-Decentralized-Insurance-on-Stablecoins.html>. See also Bridge Mutual, <https://www.bridgemutual.io/> (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).

61. See Tory Newmyer, SEC's Gensler likens stablecoins to "poker chips" amid call for tougher crypto regulation, *Washington Post* (Sept. 21, 2021), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/09/21/sec-gensler-crypto-stablecoins/>.

62. See Jeanne Smialek, Why Washington Worries About Stablecoins, *New York Times* (Sept. 23, 2021), <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/17/business/economy/federal-reserve-virtual-currency-stablecoin.html>.

63. See James Beck, How Stablecoins Are Driving Decentralized Finance on Ethereum, *ConsenSys* (Jan. 29, 2021), <https://consensys.net/blog/blockchain-explained/how-stablecoins-are-driving-decentralized-finance-on-ethereum/>.